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of libertarianism. This purpose becomes much clearer in the appendix, where the positive views of the writer are given, and a summary of his position, which the author promises to develop more fully in a book still to be published. In brief, the author takes the standpoint of the modern doctrine of relationism, that the elements of mind are real only as they are united, and vigorously condemns the atomistic doctrines of the Associationists. We must think of mind as a unity, in which every part is acted upon by every other part. But after he has asserted this general law, and has positively affirmed his acceptance of the doctrine of parallelism, he turns about and insists that the will is the result of psychical force, or of a tension that is undetermined, and that this acts with or through the physiological organism to produce its effect. "The law of mind is not the law of association, but the law of solidarity." More concretely, there results from this law the existence of a centralization that is as physiological as the cerebrum, and as psychical as the ego. From the union of these two centers we have the connection of the physical and the mental. The author's many confused statements as to the relation of body and mind are inexplicable; but it is possible to see how he can derive the conclusion that the will is free from his premises if we understand that by freedom is meant merely psychical, as opposed to physical, determinism. This is seen in the criticism of Priestley. There it is stated that Priestley's confession that he changed from libertarianism to determinism as the result of his investigations proves that the will is free; for there is nothing in the nature of the external environment apart from the will that would produce this change in belief. Even more clearly a passage in the conclusion, dealing with the argument for determinism from the uniformity of human action, bears out the same inference (p. 131). Here he argues that the uniformity may be a uniformity in the action of the will, due to physiological and psychological heredity and the progressive development of psychical activity under the influence of favorable or unfavorable circumstances, and due, therefore, to the limitations which are naturally correlated with differences in the power of the will. According to our author, then, one is free when one acts from motive, determined when there is no conscious recognition of the motive.

It is evident that the whole discussion merely proves that what is popularly known as will has psychological correlates, or is a mental process; what the conditions of the will may be, or whether it is free or determined in the accepted sense of the terms, is not even raised to say nothing of being settled.

W. B. PILLSBURY.

Classificazione della Scienze. DI CAMILLO TRIVERO. Ulrico Hoefli, Milano, 1899.—pp. xii, 292.

The object of this work is to give a new classification of the sciences on the basis of inductive inquiries into the nature of science as a whole, and of the scope ordinarily covered by the different sciences. All the earlier methods of classification are said to be at fault, either because they are not based upon an adequate comprehension of the nature of science, or because they look at science exclusively from the subjective or exclusively from the objective standpoint.

Science is defined as the discipline that treats of truth of whatever kind and wherever found. It is opposed to art, whose end is the beautiful, to religion, that strives after holiness, and to morality, whose aim is goodness. We cannot define truth nor mark off its limits with any accuracy because different phases are important under different circumstances and for different people. We can merely say that the subject matter of science is truth as it appears to men of all kinds and at all times.

The body of the book is divided into two parts, the doctrine and its application. The principle of division that is finally determined upon is on its subjective side dependent upon the relations of time and space, and upon the universality and individuality of the subject matter. From this principle of division there result three large groups, history and geography, science proper, and philosophy. Each of these differ from the others in the way in which it treats its subject matter, though the subject matter itself is, or may be, common to all. History and geography deal with events in time and space as individual facts ; science proper also deals with facts in time and space, but for it each event is regarded as a type of all events of a class, while philosophy does not treat of events in time and space, but with their universal and eternal aspects. No one of these groups could stand alone, but each depends upon the others and would be impossible without them.

In the second part, the application, the objective principles of classification are considered. First among the sciences stands the members of the rational group : logic, mathematics, and mechanics ; then come the experimental sciences, physics and chemistry. Both of these groups may be applied everywhere in nature. These have no direct analogies in history or geography, but are at the basis of many of the philosophical problems. Then come the natural sciences which give full play to the system of the author. All the natural sciences on the objective side may be divided into three groups, according as they deal with inorganic, and with organic phenomena, or with super-organic phenomena, the products of the human mind treated as historic facts. Each of these groups and many of their subdivisions give rise to historical, to geographical, to scientific, and to philosophical problems. It is, of course, impossible to go into the detail of the classification, but this will serve to point out its strong and its weak points. In conclusion, while it must be admitted that there are still inconsistencies in the placing of individual sciences, there is no doubt that new criteria for division are brought to light by the discussion that will be of great help to any future worker in the same field.

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